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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Harry W. Bodine, Jr. filed this action, seeking, among 
other things, to recover under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on claims that 
certain Delaware State Troopers violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights by illegally entering his house without first knocking and 
requesting admission, by arresting him without probable cause, 
and by using excessive force to effect his arrest.  At the close 
of the evidence, the district court awarded judgment as a matter 
of law in favor of Bodine on the issue of liability with respect 
to the illegal entry claim.  The court later instructed the jury 
that it need not determine whether the troopers used excessive 
force in arresting Bodine because their unlawful entry rendered 
any use of force unreasonable.  The jury then returned a verdict 
in favor of the troopers on the unlawful arrest claim and, on the 
remaining claims, awarded Bodine compensatory damages of $25,000, 
an amount that was far below what he had sought.  Bodine 
appealed, arguing that the small award of damages was against the 
weight of the evidence.  The troopers cross-appealed, contending, 
among other things, that the district court erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bodine on the illegal 
entry claim and in framing its instructions regarding their 
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liability for damages stemming from their conduct.  We hold that 
judgment as a matter of law was improper in this case and that 
the court's analysis of the issue of damages was incorrect.  We 
therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
     I. 
 This case resulted from events that occurred in 
December 1990.  Bodine had custody of his three sons, but their 
mother, Helen Knight, had visitation rights every other Saturday. 
On December 21, Bodine failed to appear at a hearing in Delaware 
Family Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt 
for violating a prior court order regarding visitation.  Bodine 
telephoned the court and said that "although he received notice 
of the hearing . . . he had no intention of appearing . . . or 
bringing the children with him. . . . "  The court issued an 
order holding Bodine in contempt and fining him $100.  To make up 
for visits that Knight had lost as a result of Bodine's conduct, 
the court ordered that the children be turned over to her for 
visitation at 8 a.m. at the Smyrna, Delaware, police station on 
the next three Saturdays.  The order further provided: 
 Any police agency is authorized to 
assist Ms. Knight in securing Mr. Bodine's 
compliance with this order upon being 
presented with a certified copy thereof. 
Should police assistance again become 
necessary to secure the Court ordered 
visitation, Ms. Knight is specifically 
authorized to enter upon the property of Mr. 
Bodine in the company of a police officer to 
receive her children. 
 
Id. at B-12. 
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 On the next Saturday, December 29, Bodine did not bring 
the children to the Smyrna police station at 8 a.m., as required 
by the order, and Knight sought the assistance of the Delaware 
State Police.  At some time between 8:10 a.m. and 8:20 a.m., 
Knight and three state troopers, James Warwick, Richard Frunzi, 
and Philip Pitt, arrived at Bodine's house.  Bodine observed the 
police cars approach the house.  He testified that he thought 
they were there to enforce the visitation order, but he said that 
he was surprised that they had come because he and Knight had 
customarily given each other "a half-hour leeway" in turning over 
the children.   
 Trooper Warwick approached the house.  Warwick 
testified that the Family Court order had previously been 
circulated to the members of his troop, that "Harry Bodine and 
the whole custody dispute" was a matter of "officer safety 
concern" for "the entire troop," and that a memorandum concerning 
the matter had been distributed to the troopers.  He also stated 
that he was "cautious" as a result of two prior visits to the 
Bodine residence, one for the purpose of executing a warrant for 
Bodine's arrest and the other in connection with the custody 
dispute.  On one of those occasions, Warwick said, Bodine had 
told him "something to the effect that" if the police ever tried 
to arrest him, "it [was] not going to happen" and he was "not 
going to let [them] arrest [him]."  According to Warwick, Bodine 
also said that if the police came to his house, they were "going 
to pay."  As a result of these experiences, Warwick said that he 
regarded Bodine as "unstable" and "very violent." 
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 The troopers walked to the front door and knocked, but 
Bodine told him to go to the back because a Christmas tree was 
blocking the front door.  They then walked to the back door and 
knocked again.  After Bodine opened the door, he and Warwick 
spoke.  What happened from this point on was the subject of sharp 
dispute.  According to Warwick, the following occurred.  Warwick 
asked Bodine why the children had not been brought to the police 
station by 8 a.m. as required by the court order, and Bodine 
responded that he had until 8:30 a.m.   Bodine was raising his 
voice, his eyes were twitching, and his lips were trembling. 
These signs caused Warwick concern.  Warwick told Bodine to have 
the children ready in five minutes, and Bodine said, "I will have 
them ready when I feel like it."  Warwick was leaning forward at 
the doorway, and he wanted to continue to talk to Bodine to calm 
the situation, but Bodine slammed the door and tried to hit 
Warwick in the face with it.  Warwick jumped back and heard 
Bodine "fiddling around with the door" on the inside.  It sounded 
to Warwick as if Bodine was trying to lock the door, so Warwick 
grabbed the doorknob, pushed the door open, and entered the 
house, followed by Troopers Pitt and Frunzi.   
 Warwick advised Bodine that he was under arrest and 
attempted to grab Bodine's right arm, but Bodine pulled away. 
Warwick then grabbed Bodine's right arm and tried to handcuff 
him, but Bodine pulled away again, and they wrestled to the 
floor.  Pitt then grabbed Bodine's right arm and put his knee and 
shin against Bodine's back in order to restrict his movements and 
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handcuff him.  The troopers handcuffed Bodine, assisted him to 
his feet, and removed him from the house. 
 Bodine, the woman with whom he was then living, and the 
children who testified for him gave a very different account of 
these events.  According to Bodine, when he opened the back door, 
he immediately told Warwick that the children would be ready in 
five minutes, and Warwick responded, "Okay, you have five 
minutes."  After closing the door "firmly" because it was old and 
swollen, Bodine walked away, but Warwick forcibly opened the 
door, hitting Bodine in the back and knocking him off balance. 
Warwick immediately grabbed Bodine's arms from behind and threw 
him around the kitchen--from the table to the counter to the 
floor--while Bodine offered no resistance.  Bodine began to 
scream with pain, and he felt as if his arms were being broken.   
 When Bodine was thrown to the floor, Pitt came down on 
Bodine's back with his knee.  While Warwick held Bodine's arms, 
Pitt placed his knee against the upper portion of Bodine's back 
and pressed Bodine's head to the floor.  At this point, Bodine 
heard his neck crack.  Bodine was then raised by the troopers, 
handcuffed, and escorted to the police station.  He was 
subsequently convicted in state court for the crimes of menacing 
and resisting arrest. 
 After his arrest, Bodine was diagnosed as having 
serious back injuries, and he eventually underwent three 
operations.  Bodine testified that he suffered great pain, and 
the evidence showed that he was completely unable to work for 
some time.  In addition, he introduced expert testimony that his 
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injuries would permanently restrict the type of work that he was 
able to do and the number of years that he would be able to work. 
According to an economist who testified for Bodine, his total 
lost wages during his lifetime were between $576,000 and 
$1,000,000.  There was also evidence, however, that Bodine had 
back problems before his arrest; that he did not report hearing 
his neck "crack" during some of his initial medical examinations 
after his arrest; and that his injuries were exacerbated by his 
failure to follow the regimen that his physician prescribed. 
 In December 1992, Bodine filed this action in district 
court against Troopers Warwick, Pitt, and Frunzi, as well as 
several other defendants who are no longer in the case.  In 
February 1994, the case proceeded to trial on three theories of 
liability: illegal entry, unlawful arrest, and excessive use of 
force.  At the end of the testimony, Bodine moved for judgment as 
a matter of law on liability with respect to two of these 
theories, illegal entry and excessive force.  The court granted 
this motion with respect to the illegal entry claim.  Moreover, 
the court reasoned that, once the troopers entered the house 
illegally, "any harm or damage that they inflict[ed] on the 
plaintiff as a result of the illegal entry [was] per se 
unreasonable . . . and [Bodine] was entitled to damages for 
that."  3/8/94 Tr. at E-31.  The court added that it was 
therefore unnecessary to submit the issue of excessive force to 
the jury because the troopers were liable for all of the damages 
that they caused even if they did not use excessive force.  Id.   
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The court also held that the troopers had waived the defense of 
qualified immunity by not asserting it in their answer or at the 
pretrial conference.  Id. at E-37.  
 Before the case was submitted to the jury, Bodine 
dismissed all claims against Trooper Frunzi for compensatory 
damages, and the court awarded nominal damages of $1.00 against 
all of the troopers on the illegal entry claim.  In instructing 
the jury, the court said that the plaintiff had to prove that the 
defendants' "conduct" was the proximate cause of the injuries he 
sustained.  Id. at E-63.  The court stated that it had already 
determined that the troopers had entered the house illegally and 
that the jury would therefore not be requested to decide that 
question.  Id. at E-68.  The court likewise told the jury that it 
was not required to determine whether the troopers had used 
excessive force once inside the house because it had "determined 
as a matter of law that once the officers entered the premises, 
no amount of force would have been reasonable."  Id. at E-70.  
 After receiving these instructions and deliberating, 
the jury found that the troopers had not arrested Bodine 
unlawfully, that their actions were the proximate cause of injury 
to him, and that he was entitled to compensatory damages of 
$25,000.  Bodine moved for a new trial on the issue of damages, 
but the court denied that motion.  Bodine then appealed, and the 
troopers cross-appealed. 
II.    
 We will first discuss the issue of liability with 
respect to Bodine's illegal entry claim.  As noted, the district 
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court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bodine on 
this issue.  In order for us to sustain this ruling, the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
parties, must have been insufficient to permit a reasonable jury 
to find in their favor.  See, e.g., Wittekamp v. Gulf & Western, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 1137, 1141 & n.7 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 309 (1993); Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 815 (3rd 
Cir. 1991).  Under this standard, we hold that judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of Bodine was improper.  In addition, 
contrary to the troopers' argument, we hold that judgment as a 
matter of law in their favor on this claim was likewise 
unwarranted.  As we previously observed, there was sharply 
conflicting evidence regarding the critical events in this case. 
Depending on which version of the facts it believed, a reasonable 
jury could have found for either side on the illegal entry claim. 
Accordingly, that claim should have been sent to the jury.  
 In considering the legality of the troopers' entry into 
the Bodine residence, we begin with the terms of the order of the 
Delaware Family Court, which is important both with respect to 
what it does and does not authorize.  We read the order as giving 
the troopers the authority to effect an involuntary transfer of 
the children from Bodine to Knight for the purpose of 
implementing Knight's visitation rights and to enter on Bodine's 
property for this purpose, but we do not read the order as giving 
the troopers the authority to enter the Bodine residence 
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unannounced.0  In other words, we view the order as giving the 
troopers authority similar for present purposes to that conveyed 
by an ordinary search or arrest warrant.  Such a warrant would 
authorize an executing officer to enter the property where the 
search or seizure was to occur but would not confer "no knock" 
authority unless the warrant so indicated.  An ordinary warrant 
is not construed as conferring such authority, and we do not so 
construe the court order involved here.  We simply do not see 
anything in the order that supports that construction.  Moreover, 
the troopers have not brought to our attention any authority for 
the proposition that the family court judge had the authority 
under state law to issue a "no knock" order, and even if he had 
such authority, it is not apparent that he had a factual basis 
for authorizing an unannounced entry at the time when the order 
was issued.   
 Since the family court order conferred authority 
similar to that of an ordinary search or arrest warrant, the 
troopers' authority to enter the Bodine residence in carrying out 
the mandate of that order was similar to that of an officer 
executing an ordinary warrant.  Last term, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 
115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed the question 
whether there are circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment 
                     
0If we were called upon to decide whether the troopers have 
qualified immunity for the entry, we would ask whether a 
reasonable officer could have interpreted the order as granting 
the authority to enter unannounced.  But since the district court 
held that the troopers had waived this defense and they have not 
challenged that ruling on appeal, we do not address the issue of 
qualified immunity. 
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requires that officers knock and announce their presence before 
entering a dwelling for the purpose of making an otherwise lawful 
seizure or search.  After tracing the acceptance of the knock-
and-announce rule by common law courts, the Court held that 
"[g]iven the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice 
of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the 
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry 
into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be considered in 
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure."  Id. at 
1918.  However, the Court added: 
This is not to say, of course, that every 
entry must be preceded by an announcement. 
The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement 
of reasonableness should not be read to 
mandate a rigid rule of announcement that 
ignores countervailing law enforcement 
interests.   
 
Id.  The Court noted some of the circumstances under which the 
common law did not require officers to knock and announce, and 
among these were "circumstances presenting a threat of physical 
violence."   Id. at 1918-19.   
 The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson was anticipated 
in large part by our decision in United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 
589 (3rd Cir. 1983).  In that case, we held that there are 
circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment requires officers to 
knock and announce.  Id. at 600-02.  "We suggested that the 
Fourth Amendment does not impose a specific rule governing forced 
entries but rather imposes a general requirement of 
reasonableness, informed by the goals of preventing undue 
12 
invasion of privacy and destruction of private property."  United 
States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 302 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1115 (1994).  Moreover, in United States v. Kane, 637 
F.2d 974, 978 (3rd Cir. 1981), in discussing the similar but not 
necessarily identical knock-and-announce rule0 codified in 18 
U.S.C. §31090, we held that "a police officer's reasonable belief 
that announcement might place him or his associates in physical 
peril constitutes [an] 'exigent circumstance' . . . that 
justifies non-compliance with the announcement provisions of the 
statute."  See also United States v. Jewell, 60 F.3d 20, 23 (1st 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1395 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994); United States v. 
Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, sub nom. 
Herman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1084 (1994).  In light of 
these authorities, it seems clear that if the troopers in this 
case had a reasonable belief that they were facing a "threat of 
physical violence" when Bodine closed the door after speaking 
with Warwick, the Fourth Amendment did not require them to knock 
and announce their presence before entering the house. 
 A reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the troopers, could have found the following. 
Warwick, the officer who opened the door and entered first, knew 
that domestic relations cases are dangerous, that Bodine had 
previously resisted allowing visitation by Knight to the point of 
                     
0See Stiver, 9 F.3d at 301-02; Nolan, 718 F.2d at 600. 
0As we noted in Stiver, 9 F.2d at 301-02, this statute applies to 
federal officers.  It is thus inapplicable here.  
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standing in contempt, that Bodine had again failed to comply with 
a court order for visitation that morning, that the visitation 
dispute regarding Bodine's children was a matter of "officer 
safety concern" for his entire troop, and that Bodine had 
previously threatened that if the police came to his house again 
they would have to "pay" and that he would not let them arrest 
him.   When Bodine answered the back door, he was surly and 
uncooperative.  In response to Warwick's demand that the children 
be ready in five minutes, Bodine said that he would have them 
ready "when he felt like it."  Bodine gave "nonverbal signs" of 
considerable emotion: he raised his voice; his eyes twitched; and 
his lips trembled.  He slammed the door and attempted to hit 
Warwick with it in the face.  And after Bodine did this, Warwick 
heard sounds that led him to suspect that Bodine was trying to 
lock the door.  Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the officers were justified in believing that 
Bodine was planning to use physical violence so as to avoid 
complying with the visitation requirement.   
 The troopers would have a stronger case if there was 
evidence in the record that Bodine had access to firearms or 
other lethal weapons in the house, but the absence of such 
evidence is a matter for the trier of fact to weigh.  The parties 
have not brought to our attention any evidence that the troopers 
had a basis for being certain that there were no such weapons in 
the house, and the average house contains implements, such as 
knives and tools, that can be wielded with dangerous effect. 
Thus, the evidence, if viewed in a light favorable to the 
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troopers, was adequate to support a verdict in their favor on the 
illegal entry claim.    
 By contrast, if the jury believed Bodine's very 
different version of the events, the troopers lacked any 
reasonable basis for fearing physical violence from Bodine. Under 
this version of the events, Bodine did not turn over the children 
at 8 a.m. due to misunderstanding, offered to have them ready in 
five minutes, and did not slam the door in Warwick's face, but 
merely shut it "firmly" because it was swollen and difficult to 
close.  Consequently, we hold that the issue of liability on the 
illegal entry claim should have been submitted to the jury. 
 In arguing that the district court erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law for Bodine, the troopers rely, not 
only on the danger that they allegedly faced, but also on what 
they characterize as several other "exceptions" to the knock-and-
announce rule: the "useless gesture,"0 fear-of-flight,0 and "hot 
pursuit"0 exceptions.  In view of the possibility that Bodine's 
illegal entry claim will be retried on remand, these arguments 
warrant comment.  Under Wilson and Nolan, it does not appear to 
be strictly correct to view the Fourth Amendment as containing a 
knock-and-announce rule with certain fixed "exceptions." Instead, 
those cases interpret the Fourth Amendment as containing a 
flexible requirement that all searches and seizures be 
                     
0Citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963)(Brennan, J., 
dissenting in part); Kane, 637 F.2d at 978; United States v. 
Singleton, 439 F.2d 381, 385-86 (3rd Cir. 1971).  
0Citing Ker, 374 U.S. at 74 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kane, 637 
F.2d at 978.  
0Citing Santana v. United States, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).  
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"reasonable" and regard an officer's failure to announce his or 
her presence before entering a dwelling to carry out an otherwise 
lawful search or seizure as a factor to consider in assessing 
reasonableness.  See Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918; Nolan, 718 F.2d 
at 600-02.  
 With this understanding in mind, we think that the 
facts on which the troopers rely in advancing their "useless 
gesture" argument -- Bodine's knowledge that the troopers had 
already knocked twice and were outside his house -- are relevant 
but not dispositive in determining whether their entry was 
lawful.  Because Bodine had seen the troopers and knew that they 
were outside, some of the dangers often associated with 
unannounced, forcible entries -- for example, the danger that the 
troopers would be mistaken for burglars0 -- were diminished.  On 
the other hand, other dangers that might have been avoided by 
knocking and announcing -- such as the danger that property would 
be destroyed and that an occupant of the house would reflexively 
react with violence0 -- were present.   
 By contrast, the possibility that Bodine might have 
fled finds no support in the evidence and is therefore not a 
relevant factor to consider in judging the reasonableness of the 
troopers' conduct.  Indeed, the troopers themselves testified 
that they did not think that Bodine was going to flee. 
                     
0See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); Kane, 
637 F.2d at 977. 
0See Nolan, 718 F.2d at 602. 
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 In invoking the "hot pursuit" exception, the troopers 
rely on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).  They note 
that Bodine committed the offense of menacing when he slammed the 
door and tried to hit Warwick, and they argue that Warwick was in 
"hot pursuit" of Bodine to arrest him for this offense when he 
entered the house.  Although Santana concerned a somewhat 
different question from the one presented by this case, we think 
that it has some (limited) relevance here.   Unlike Wilson, 
Santana did not involve the authority of officers with a warrant 
to enter a dwelling unannounced to execute the warrant.  Instead, 
Santana involved the authority of officers to enter a dwelling to 
make a warrantless arrest.  As the Supreme Court later held in 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual 
entry into a suspect's house in order to make a routine felony 
arrest, but officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public 
place.  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  In 
Santana, the police tried to make a warrantless drug arrest 
supported by probable cause in a public place, but the suspect 
retreated into her house, and the police pursued and arrested 
her.  Concluding that this did not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court held that when officers attempt to make a 
warrantless arrest in a public place but the suspect flees into a 
dwelling the officers do not need a warrant to pursue the suspect 
and carry out the arrest.  The Court noted the need for prompt 
action to prevent the destruction of evidence (id. at 43), and 
although the Court did not expressly refer to the authority of 
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the police to enter the house without announcement, that 
authority was certainly implicit in the court's holding.  
 Although, as we noted, Santana concerned a somewhat 
different question from that presented here, we have no doubt 
that, when the police attempt to make an arrest with a warrant in 
a public place and the suspect flees into his or her home and 
closes the door, it is reasonable for the police to pursue the 
suspect inside without stopping and announcing their presence and 
intentions at the threshold.  This is so for several reasons. 
Since the suspect knows what the police are attempting to do, 
little purpose would be served by knocking and announcing.  In 
addition, in many cases, as in Santana, there will be a danger 
that evidence will be destroyed if there is delay, and there will 
sometimes be a danger of flight or a threat of harm to the 
officers as well.    
 In this case, as previously noted, the troopers' fear 
for their safety is potentially an important factor, but the risk 
of flight is not supported by the evidence.  Nor is there any 
suggestion that delay might have allowed Bodine to destroy 
evidence.  As for the argument that an announcement was 
unnecessary because Bodine must have known that Warwick was 
trying to arrest him for menacing, while we cannot say that the 
troopers should not be permitted to argue this theory to the jury 
at a retrial if they wish to do so, it appears to have scant 
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support in the record.0  Warwick did not try to arrest Bodine 
before he slammed the door and retreated inside (if Bodine can be 
said to have done so); indeed, it was not until Bodine slammed 
the door and thus menaced Warwick that Warwick had grounds to 
arrest him.  Thus, it is not at all clear that Bodine knew, prior 
to Warwick's entry, that Warwick was seeking to arrest him for 
menacing.   
 In sum, we hold that the record in this case did not 
support judgment as a matter of law for either side on the 
illegal entry claim.  Only after the jury has resolved the 
disputed factual issues regarding the relevant factors that we 
have noted can it be determined whether the troopers' unannounced 
entry was reasonable. 
 
     III. 
 We now turn to Bodine's excessive force claim.  If this 
claim is viewed separately from the illegal entry claim, it seems 
clear that the jury should have been permitted to decide whether 
the troopers' use of force was excessive.  Under the troopers' 
version of the events, it was not.  According to the troopers, 
they were simply trying to handcuff and arrest Bodine, but he 
struggled to resist arrest.  By contrast, under Bodine's version, 
the troopers' conduct -- throwing him around the kitchen and 
                     
0Judge Becker finds no support in the record for this theory and 
no basis for concluding that Bodine knew prior to the officers' 
entry that they were seeking to arrest him. 
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causing his neck to "crack" while he offered no resistance--was 
plainly excessive.   
 The district court, however, did not allow the jury to 
decide which account should be believed,  Instead, the court told 
the jury that it did not need to decide this question because, 
since the officers had entered the house illegally, any use of 
force was unlawful, and the officers were liable for all of the 
harm that ensued.  This analysis was wrong for two independent 
reasons. 
 First, as we explained in part II of this opinion, the 
record did not permit judgment as a matter of law on the illegal 
entry claim, and accordingly the court's conclusion that the 
entry was illegal was premature.  Second, even if the entry was 
unlawful, this would mean, under basic principles of tort law, 
that the troopers would be liable for the harm "proximately" or 
"legally" caused by their tortious conduct (i.e., by their 
illegal entry).  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 431 
and 871 cmt. l (1965 & 1979).  They would not, however, 
necessarily be liable for all of the harm caused in the 
"philosophic" or but-for sense by the illegal entry.  See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 431 and cmt. a (1965).   Among 
other things, they would not be liable for harm produced by a 
"superseding cause."  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§440-453 (1965).  And they certainly would not be liable for 
harm that was caused by their non-tortious, as opposed to their 
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tortious, "conduct," such as the use of reasonable force to 
arrest Bodine.0 
 A simple hypothetical will illustrate the importance of 
these distinctions in a case such as this.  Suppose that three 
police officers go to a suspect's house to execute an arrest 
warrant and that they improperly enter without knocking and 
announcing their presence.  Once inside, they encounter the 
suspect, identify themselves, show him the warrant, and tell him 
that they are placing him under arrest.  The suspect, however, 
breaks away, shoots and kills two of the officers, and is 
preparing to shoot the third officer when that officer disarms 
the suspect and in the process injures him.  Is the third officer 
necessarily liable for the harm caused to the suspect on the 
theory that the illegal entry without knocking and announcing 
rendered any subsequent use of force unlawful?  The obvious 
answer is "no."  See George v. City of Long Branch, 973 F.2d 706 
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993).  The 
suspect's conduct would constitute a "superseding" cause, see 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 (1965), that would limit the 
officer's liability.  See id. § 440.       
                     
0In reaching the conclusion that the officers' illegal entry 
rendered any later use of force unreasonable, the district court 
relied on  Schwab v. Wood, 767 F. Supp. 574, 585 (D. Del. 1991), 
which held that officers who detain a suspect without a 
reasonable suspicion are liable (unless shielded by qualified 
immunity) for harm caused by the use of any amount of force in 
effectuating that detention.  We find this holding questionable 
for reasons similar to those discussed in text.  Officers who 
detain a suspect unlawfully should be liable for the harm 
proximately caused by their tortious detention, but this will not 
necessarily include all harm resulting from the otherwise 
reasonable use of force to carry out the detention.   
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 If at a retrial in this case the jury decides that the 
troopers' entry was unlawful, it will be necessary to determine 
how much of the injury suffered by Bodine was "proximately" or 
"legally" caused by the illegal entry, and we express no view on 
this question at this time.  We merely emphasize that this 
determination must be made and that the illegal entry and 
unlawful force claims must be kept separate.  Thus, if the 
troopers are found to have entered the Bodine residence 
illegally, they should be held liable for the harm proximately 
caused by the illegal entry.  Similarly, if the troopers are 
found to have used unlawful force, they should be held liable for 
the harm proximately caused by this use of force.  The harm 
proximately caused by these two torts may overlap, but the two 
claims should not be conflated. 
22 
     IV. 
 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 
Each party is to bear his own costs. 
 
